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1.  Public institutions as a given and as stable phenomena : old institutionalism. 
 
Public administration considered as a specific domain may be defined by the political bodies 
and administrative structures that are governing public affairs. Constitutions, formal charts, 
procedures provide the conceptual glue which generates its unity and its limits.  
Up to the late 1960s, such a rather formal-legal approach had been dominating the field. In the 
USA  public  administration  theory  was  influential  within  the  field  of  political  science.  In 
European countries influenced by Roman law, science administrative  grew inside public law 
schools. Avoiding empirical observation, being quite sensitive to rationalization principles, it 
discussed official structures by reference to normative debates around the applicability of 
principles or axioms derived from theory and philosophy of law. A few contributions have 
been quite influential on the international scene and have initiated some form of dialogue with 
contemporary social science approaches  (Langrod, 1966; Chevallier, 1986).     
Public institutions were taken for granted. They were neither an issue for knowledge nor a 
problem for action. What would later on be labeled as the old institutionalism (March and 
Olson,  1984)  was  a  very  descriptive  scientific  genre.  Formal  designs  provided  the  raw 
material  for  a  scientific  approach.  It  was  postulated  that  they  defined  the  architectural 
foundation of a specific arena or polity specialized in politics and in policy making.  
Clear-cut boundaries were supposed to separate polity from society (which leaves sociology 
outside public administration theory) and politics from administration (which implies that 
bureaucracy is linked to some form of consensual rationality). The public sector, specially the 
emerging welfare state, should be treated as a homogenous and coherent actor relying upon a 
tightly coupled set of specific entities (ministries, agencies, etc.) subordinated to the will of its 
leaders and able to define a general interest criterion. Legal authority and political legitimacy 
should provide the backbone of governance. 
Descriptive typologies were often perceived as the means and ends of old institutionalism. 
The idea was that public institutions could be defined and classified according to some basic 
components  such  as  their  mission,  their  morphology  (Darbel,  1972)  or  their  degree  of 
development ( Riggs, 1971). 
Institutional optimum is achievable and should be achieved. Three sources were considered as 
influential:  
•   a  separation  between  discretionary  choice  by  elected  officials  and  conformistic 
implementation by appointed agents (Wilson, 1887),  
•  the instrumental superiority of the pure  bureaucratic form (Weber, 1978),  
•  the efficiency level of management or administrative principles such as specialization, 
centralization, proceduralization and  unity of command ( Fayol, 1916 ). 
Public  institutions  have  long  constituted  a  kind  of  iconography  of  order  (Orren  and 
Skowronek, 1994). They function as crucial determinants of a polity's essential character, 
history  and  future  development.  They  also  provide  stable  settings  or  arenas.  Public 







































7perspective with the behavioral mainstream which was dominant during the 1950s and 1960s  
in political science. Voters, lobbyists and political entrepreneurs are supposed to accept and 
understand  rules  which  are  immutable  and  forms  of  state  leadership  that  are  legitimate. 
Culture determines public and political life, not societal structures and dynamics (Almond and 
Verba,  1981).    Institutional  order  or  stability  of  the  game  conditions  research  and  action 
designs. Institutions are defined as being in a state of equilibrium, unless crises or disruptive 
periods occur and induce spot rapid and visible changes. Institutions per se do not generate 
change in an endogenous way. Their transformation is the consequence of exogenous sources 
such as economic growth, revolutions or coups d'état.   
  
2.  Institutions as scientific issues in changing societies : new institutionalist agendas  . 
 
Neo-institutionalism  defines  a  perspective  which  is  usually  associated  with  the  idea  that 
institutional  background  matter  because  they  shape  public  administration  realities  and 
processes. Specific research questions renew the agenda of public administration.  What roles 
do  institutions  play  in  providing  social  and  economic  outcomes  to  markets,  polities  and 
societies?  Do  welfare  states  produce  and  allocate  goods  and  services  in  an  efficient  and 
effective way? Is it possible to fight bureaucracies  and to develop democracies in a quick and  
voluntary  way?  Neo-institutionalism  mixes  the  will  to  understand  reality  through 
scientifically grounded knowledge and the hope to supply decision criteria for practice.   
 Public  administration  defined  as  a  specific  field  gave  birth  to  alternative  theories  and 
approaches  elaborated  by  or  borrowed  from  disciplines  such  as  history,  economics  and 
sociology of organizations. In fact the (re)discovery of institutions as independent variables or 
as explicit causes  reflects a general trend which goes beyond the sole domain of public 
administration.  The  late  1970s  and  the  early  1980s  coincide  with  growing  dissatisfaction 
about behavioralism and structuro-functionalism. 
 Public administration institutions had been marginalized as an issue for too many years by 
political scientists. Some failures of the welfare state such as increasing costs, corporatism, 
urban revolts or technocratic arrogance generated growing debates. Public agencies were used 
as favorite scapegoats. The capacity of state and local governments to manage society and 
public policies became increasingly questioned in terms of efficiency and social justice by all 
kinds of social movements as well as by neo-liberal and communitarian ideologies. Such 
doubts and critiques were massively expressed in the Anglo-Saxon world.  
To a large extent, the notion of neo-institutionalism does not define a unified theory. It covers 
a rather loose set of specific schools of thought. Some have developed without any reference 
to the others or even come to contradictory conclusions, as it is the case with the possibility to 
enact radical changes. Three of them are really relevant as far as their impacts upon the 
ideological debates and the research paradigms in public administration have been important   
:  rational  choice  institutionalism,  historical  institutionalism,  sociological  institutionalism 
(Peters, 1998). 
 
2.1.Rational choice institutionalism. 
 
Rational  choice  institutionalism  studies  political  phenomena  in  a  specific  way.  It  applies  







































7It  stresses  the  importance  of  handling  transaction  costs  when  collective  action  is  needed 
(Williamson,  1975).  Such  is  the  case  when  considering  the  functioning  of  the  Federal 
Congress in the USA. Contrary to what classic rational choice in economics would expect to 
happen, majorities are rather stable from one legislature to another. The reason is linked to the 
fact that procedural rules exist which lower transaction costs legislators usually face. They 
structure choices and information available to individual members of the Congress in such a 
way that agreements can be reached which allow a rather fair distribution of benefits among 
them (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975 ; Riker, 1980). Institutions generate equilibria.  
At least three different versions exist inside the rational choice inspired new institutionalism. 
 A first one emphasizes the agency or the principal-agent model. The problem it addresses is 
the  control  of  the  bureaucrats  by  the  elected  politicians.  Public  organizations  tend  to 
overspend even in democracies (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971). Some analytic framework 
(which is neither hierarchical authority nor clientelism or partisan allegiance) is provided by 
rational choice theorists. It is supposed to allow the principal (the parliament or the political 
cabinet) to make the agent (a public agency) act in a way the principal would like the latter to 
behave. Specific incentives and punishments are set up around bilateral contracts in order to 
generate compliance. 
Such an approach has been used in practice. New Zealand has reorganized its public sector 
organizations  along  these  lines  (Boston,  1991).  France  has  set  up  autonomous  regulatory 
agencies which structure their relationships with the regulated economic industries in terms 
quite similar to the principal-agents ideal type. On the other hand, public administration offers 
quite  few  examples  in  which  one  specific  public  agency  is  dependant  from  one  single 
principal. Most if not all the general directorates of the European Commission are dependant 
from multiple principals. Rational choice institutionalism tends to oversimplify real life cases.       
Game theory provides another set of choice models about types of institutions (Calvert, 1995). 
The reasoning here again supposes that two or more actors act in a free or non prestructured 
setting and are involved in a game, in an interdependence relationship around some common 
task or problem. The model assumes that each of them wants to maximize its own utility in 
such a context. But none af the player is able to predict the behavior of the partner-opponent. 
What cooperation scheme to choose when the game is repetitive among the same players and 
when defection becomes too costly for them, such as is the case in budgetary processes in 
democracies (Wildavsky, 1992). Formal game theory offers some solutions for institutional 
arrangements  which  may  satisfy  such  prerequisites:  linking    competitors  who  are 
simultaneously interdependent and selfish. 
A third version of rational choice institutionalism defines institutions as providers of rules for 
choice and action (Ostrom, 1990). 
Rules  are  considered  as  the  best  mechanism  by  which  administrative  behaviors  can  be 
influenced so as to exploit resources in the most appropriate way. Sanctions for not obeying 
such rules provide the main and most effective vehicle for conformity. The model is applied 
to situations in which some common property resources have to be allocated or consumed. 
The rational choice institutionalism as such offers a prescriptive perspective. It also pretends 
to explain actual public administration contexts. For instance, the Federal Congress in the 
USA  acts  as  a  principal  who  is  able  to  control  and  supervise  in  a  rational  way  many 
autonomous administrative agencies with the help of some specific institutional procedures 
(Pratt  and  Zeckhauser,  1991;  Milgrom  and  Roberts,  1992).  The  growth  of  international 







































7maximize  the  satisfaction  of  their  own  preferences,  who  have  a  clear  perception  of  their 
preferences and act in a selfish way (Oye, 1993).  
Institutions are the outcomes of a world based around generalized individualism. They get 
designed and have an influence upon individual behaviors of their members because the latter 
get in return more than what they loose. Would the individuals change their preferences, the 
institution would collapse. Public institutions survive and develop because exchanges  and 
interactions satisfy their member preference function. 
 
2.2.Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical stream was born in the early 1980s  (Hall, 1986)and 
labeled as such later on (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992).  
This  perspective  defines  public  administration  as  a  part  of  political  life.  The  essence  of 
politics is made out of competition processes for scarce resources between rival groups. The 
State does not act as a neutral agent between competing interests, but as a complex set of 
differentiated  institutions,  as  underlined  by  neomarxist  (Katzenstein,  1978;  Evans,  1985), 
neocorporatist (Anderson, 1979) or mainstream scholars (Dupuy and Thoenig, 1985). The 
British Treasury is fragmented into several policy communities, each of them gathering public 
servants  and  private  associations  who  share  common  views  or  are  involved  in  common 
problem handling (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974).     
Why are empirically such resources and power allocated in an unequal way by the public 
sector? Why do old issues and solutions of the past influence in such a massive way the 
present agenda?  A key hypothesis tested by historical institutionalism is that the current 
outcomes of public policies do not reflect the mere preferences or interests of the current 
strongest  competitors,  but  that  they  are  channeled  by  the  existing  and  past  institutional 
arrangements in which competition takes place. It explores how policy choices made in the 
past shape choices made today. Institutions such as political and administrative organizations, 
or conventions and procedures regulating the relationships economic actors and the state, are 
path-dependent. Modes of conflict-cooperation and the structure of outcomes are to a large 
degree persistently identical throughout time.  
Radical changes in public administration are a rather hopeless endeavor in such contexts. 
Existing institutions structure the design and the content of the decisions themselves. Future 
action reflects past experience. Such a perspective explains for instance how and why trade 
unions carry so divergent views of the world as it is the case in the USA and in Great Britain. 
Different institutional contexts between countries, as characterized by the real power of the 
judiciary, model divergent preferences and interpretations of action by the labor movement 
organizations (Hattam, 1993). 
Historical  institutionalists  favor  comparative  approaches  between  different  countries, 
combining in depth study and longitudinal research.. They bring political conflict and social 
dissent back in, studying a variety of settings in which collective action implies interactions 
between the public sector and society at large. They criticize the idea that the state functions 
as a single and hands-off agent who would elaborate compromises between competing social 
and economic interests.  
Understood as a complex set of specific organizations and loosely coupled procedures which 
may  contradict  or  conflict,  the  public  sector  is  structured  around  non  symetric  power 
relationships.  Other  social  and  political  institutions  such  as  trade  unions,  economic 







































7order  and  political  legitimacy  (Rose  and  Davies,  1994).  Certain  groups  or  coalitions 
consistently win while others consistently lose. 
Public institutions influence administrative and socio-political actors in two ways. They offer 
some degree of predictability about the behaviors and stakes of the actors. They also define 
models of behaviors and sets of protocoles that are rather stereotyped and ready for immediate 
use. Institutions such as public agencies provide moral and cognitive frameworks that allow 
third  parties  and  their  own  members  to  make  sense  of  events  and  to  act  in  specific 
circumstances. They supply information. They also shape the identity, the image of self and 
the preferences of administrative behaviors.  
Institutional  designs  themselves  do  not  reflect  intentionality.  Criteria  used  when  public 
policies and organizations were initially designed rapidly vanish. Political rationalities and 
coalitions take over and determine outcomes. A model of "punctuated equilibrium" posits that 
institutions simply respond to changes in the power balance within society (Krasner, 1984). 
Therefore they are epiphenomenal, and the pressures for change are external to them. While 
old institutionalism postulates that institutions shape policies and politics, new institutionalists 
underline the fact that politics shape institutions. 
Public institutions may also be taken for granted and provide the infrastructure for collective 
action  elaboration.  Because  they  acquire  the  status  of  social  conventions,  they  are  never 
questioned.    In  any  case,  as  social  constructs,  they  resist  any  incremental  change  or  any 




Sociologists  provide  a  third  major  perspective  which  influences  rather  strongly  public 
administration as a body of grounded knowledge. It has been carried mainly by American 
theorists of organization who question the validity of the distinction made between rationality 
- bureaucracy supposedly providing as such and in a universalistic way the ideal type of 
ends/means linkaging  - and culture - social practices being influenced by  norms and values 
reflecting the specificities of local contexts.   
The historic origins of such a perspective go back to the late 1940s when Philip Selznick 
made  a  pioneering  theoretical  contribution  around  his  study  of  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority (Selznick, 1948 and 1949). He favoured a natural system approach, reacting to what 
he described as the inadequacy of the rational system perspective developed by scholars like 
Herbert Simon (Simon, 1945). He defined an organization such as a public agency no longer 
as been a collectivity deliberately constructed in order to achieve specific goals, but as a 
collectivity in and of itself.  
As field observation consistently suggests, incongruities exist between the declared ends and 
those  that  the  public  organization  actually  achieves  or  seeks  to  achieve.    It  pursues  self-
support  and  self-maintenance  goals,  as  well  as  productive  ends.  It  may  turn  into  a 
polymorphous system whose struggle to survive may induce it to neglect or to distort its 
goals. Organizations may be passive instruments, they also possess a live of their own and 
become active entrepreneurs. People who participate are complete wholes, they do not act 
solely in accordance with the roles assigned to them.   
The issue for public management is not highly formalized structures designed to regulate 
performance and to coordinate behaviors, but the way these are influenced, transformed and 







































7public organizations, in grass roots units in charge of operational tasks and implementation of 
national policies, matters a lot, in some cases as much as what happens at the top level.  
An agency like TVA must cope with the constraints and pressures applied by the outside 
social context in which it operates. Therefore it develops its own organization character and 
acquires values that go beyond the technical requirements of organizational tasks. This is the 
institutionalization process of the organization, a process that no organization of any duration 
is  completely  free  of.  "To  institutionalize  is  to  infuse  with  value  beyond  the  technical 
requirements of the task at hand"( Selznick, 1957 : 17). It takes place for example by selective 
recruiting of personnel, by establishing strong ties or alliances with outside groups through 
processes such as cooptation, etc. Thick institutionalization is achieved when some rules or 
procedures are sanctified, when some units or members of the public agency have become 
semi-autonomous  centers  of  power  and  develop  their  own  vested  interests,  or  when 
administrative  rituals  symbols,  and  ideologies  exist.  Expectations,  behaviors,  beliefs  are 
channeled and stabilized. Moral communities become set up. 
 TVA develops as a public institution in a  gradual manner, without any explicit design forces 
behind. It becomes valued by some of its members and by outside vested interests such as 
local farmers associations for the special place it holds in the larger social system. 
The  perspective  set  by  Selznick  came  to  be  neglected  during  the  1970s.  Sociology  of 
organizations had become dominated by approaches such  as contingency theory, resource 
dependence and population ecology. They had rehabilitated an instrumental and a technicist 
view of organizations.  Efficiency and survival in unstable and unpredictable environments 
were defined as being incompatible with certain types of formal structures and procedures 
such as the bureaucratic model. Empirical research attention was also mainly allocated to 
firms by business school academics. Public administration became a rather neglected topic. 
Sociological  institutionalism  arises  in  the  late  1970s,  basically  in  the  USA  and  around 
departments of sociology. Theorists of organization develop institutional analysis or thinking 
as a new and promising field (Meyer and Scott, 1983).  Public organizations are primarily 
analyzed such as art museums (DiMaggio, 1983), city administration (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1991) private and public elementary schools or healthcare programs  (Scott and Meyer, 1994).  
This perspective borrows from Selznick but adds novelty and breadth. It studies the process of 
institutionalization, or, put in other terms, the socially legitimized activities which in the long 
run come to characterize certain aspects of social life (Scott, 1995) One of the pioneering 
contributions deals for instance with formal structure as myth and ceremony (Meyer-Rowan, 
1977). While Selznick emphasized political processes such as group conflict and intentional 
cooptation  of  external  constituencies,  the  new  generation  of  institutional  sociologists 
downplays  their  importance  while  it  emphasizes  the  importance  of  other  sources  of 
constraints such as conformity pressures or legitimacy imperatives. It also locates irrationality 
in the formal structure itself, not only in informal interactions such as influence patterns. 
Institutionalization is fundamentally a process of a cognitive nature (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991).   
The focus in not so much on  a single organization with its specific context relegated to the 
background,  but  on  the  individual  organization defined  as  a  consequence  of  this  context.  
More  than  identifying  mere  pressures  exerted  locally  on  the  organization,  institutional 
sociologists  study  what  they  define  as  organizational  fields  (DiMaggio,  1983),  which  are 
formed  by  bodies  ranging  from  public  institutions  (hospitals,  aging  centers,  etc.)  to 
professional activities (doctors, teachers, etc.). The organizational field of a public system is 







































7an institutional context within which each specific single organization  has to plot its courses 
of action.  
Organizational reality is theoretically framed as symbolic construction. New institutionalism 
emphasizes  the  cultural  messages  transmitted  by  specific  institutional  systems  or  the 
explanatory  significance  of  institutionalized  myths.  These  norms  and  values  shape 
organizational structurings through interactions among institutional logics made up of socially 
accepted beliefs and the organizational practices associated with them. 
The key research question refers to an empirical observation. Why do so many organizations, 
whether public or private, adopt formal structures, procedures and institutional symbols which 
are so identical? Within a few years, most cities in a given country drop patronage systems 
and adopt human resource methods to run their public agencies. The ministries in charge of 
education in most countries around the world adopt rather identical formal structures and 
modes of functioning.  Institutional sociologists study diffusion processes characterized by 
institutional  isomorphic  change  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983).  Innovation  is  not  adopted 
mainly because it provides added efficiency value.  Other mechanisms are at work such as 
coercive isomorphism - change results from pressures exerted by political influence and by 
other  organizations  considered  as  legitimate  -,  mimetic  isomorphism  -  uncertainty  and 
ambiguity  about  goals  or  technology  increases  the  adoption  of  imitation  conducts  -  and 
normative isomorphism - the existence across different organizations of individuals belonging 
to  the  same  profession  or  having  followed  the  same  educational  processes  accelerates 
similarities of various kinds.  
Compared to historical and rational choice neo-institutionalisms, the sociological perspective 
defines what institutional means in a much wider and global way. Beside formal rules and 
procedures, it includes symbols, moral models and cognitive schemes. Institutions provide the 
frames of meaning which guide human action. They are similar to culture or cultural systems. 
They influence the conducts of public administrators not only by stating what they have to do 
when where and how, but also by shaping the ways of reasoning and the imagination of the 
actors about alternatives and solutions in new contexts. Such a macro-sociological definition 
may lead to a view of public administrations as systems of action that operate without actual 
specific actors. Society shapes the  acts and non-acts, the structures and the values of the 
public sector.  
While both the rational choice and historical schools study the creation of new institutions 
from  scratch,  sociological  neo-institutionalists  underline  the  fact  that  the  public  sector  is 
already crowded with existing organizations which provide references and models for the new 
ones. Designing institutions radically different from the existing ones becomes an illusion in a 
world which constraints autonomy of choice and limits action oriented imagination.  Why do 
public organizations adopt new institutional practices? In the short term, pressures toward 
isomorphism are strong.  Reinforcing their political legitimacy or the improving the social 
image of their members is a major reason why public organizations as well as firms conform. 
Values  that  are  recognized  by  their  environment  drive  transformation  much  more  than 
instrumental rationalities increasing their efficiency or effectiveness.  
Sociologists dealing with institutional analysis provide evidence about change processes. In 
the mid term, more diversity or competition between alternative organizational models is 
possible and isomorphic pressures are weaker within a given institutional framework (Kondra 
and Hinings, 1998). The concept of archetype is used to describe operating organizational 
transformation. Archetype refers to a configuration of structures and systems of organizing 
with a common orientation or underlying interpretative scheme. Evolutionary change occurs 







































7(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Organizational transformation or revolutionary change is 
theorized to occur with a change in the dominant archetype. It happens swiftly and affects all 
the  parts  of  the  organization  simultaneously.  It  is  associated  with  interactions  between 
exogenous dynamics (institutional contexts) and endogenous dynamics of interests, values 
and power dependencies. Pressures for change are precipitated under two conditions. Inside 
the agency, group dissatisfaction with the way heterogeneous interests are made compatible 
within the existing template for organizing is coupled with a value commitment. Outside the 
public agency, exogenous dynamics exist that also push for an alternative template. Situations 
are  also  identified  that  generate  de-institutionalization  processes  (Oliver,  1992).  Some 
institutionalized organizational activity or practice gets eroded or is facing discontinuity when 
not rejection over time.  
 
3.  Institutions as determinants of political life : a normative theory. 
 
New institutionalism as an explicit notion or as a structured school of thought finds its origins 
in a seminal paper published in the early 1980s by James March and  Johan Olsen (March and 
Olsen, 1984). A scientific ambition should be pursued by public administration. Principles 
should  be  dropped  and  substituted  by  laws  as  criteria  of  knowledge.  Much  more  than 
sociological  institutionalism,  it  is  action  oriented  and  actionable.  It  is  also  normative.  A 
general theoretical question drives such a perspective. What are the foundations of democracy 
in contemporary societies? 
 Public institutions should be considered as key factors. Government is in the business of 
forming  its  environments,  not  adapting  to  it.  Public  administrators  are  driven  by  societal 
visions and political projects. Therefore organizations which handle public affairs should be 
'conceptualized as institutions rather than as instruments' (Brunsson and Olsen, 1997: 20). 
They generate and implement rules which define how the rules of the game have to be played, 
who is legitimate to participate, what are the acceptable agendas, which sanctions to apply in 
case of deviations, as well as the process by which changes should occur. The way people 
think, interpret facts, act and cope with conflicts are influenced and simplified by public 
administration.  Any  relevant  answer  to  the  question  of  democracy  implies  a  good 
understanding of the properties of political institutions, of their construction processes and 
their  real  modes  of  functioning.  Political  science  has  to  address  the  core  issue  of  their 
governance. Academics  should observe empirically whether public administration reforms 
match societal needs and widen democratic participation. Is the very idea that it is possible to 
reform and control public organizations a relevant rule for action? The answer provided by 
the normative theory tends to be that it is a rather dangerous and inefficient value.   
A crucial task for social science research is to make explicit the less than convincing axioms 
or hypotheses that existing theories carry about organizations and institutions. Contextualism 
stipulates that politics is a component of society which is the mere product of factors such as 
social  classes,  culture  or  demography  but  is  itself  not  at  all  a  cause  of  such  factor. 
Reductionism  postulates  that  political  phenomena  are  mere  consequences  of  individual 
behaviors, for instance that the functioning of a public agency is explainable by the behavior 
model of the single bureaucrat. Economic utilitarism implies that conducts of individuals are 
basically driven by their own selfish interest. Functionalist approaches adopt darwinian view 
points:  historical  evolution  selects  the  organizational  forms  which  fit  the  environmental 
requirements. An instrumental perspective claims that the core role political life fulfills is to 







































7The  founding  fathers  of  self-proclaimed  new  institutionalism  claim  that  alternative  ways 
should be tested. Public institutions may experience a large degree of autonomy and follow a 
logic of their own, independently of outside influences or requirements. The historical process 
happens to select organizational forms which are non efficient. Symbols, myths and rituals 
have more impact upon political and administrative events than immediate material issues.  
To a large extent, new institutionalism opens political science and public administration to 
organizational theory. More precisely, it is strongly influenced by one particular research 
tradition: the concepts, models and tool bags which originated out of the Carnegie school. 
Compared with other institutionalism schools, the March and Olsen approach offers at least 
two distinctive advantages. Administrative behavior is tackled with powerful analytical tools. 
The real functioning of organizations defines the research agenda.    
The  logic  of  consequentiality  is  questionable.  Action  in  organizations  is  not  very  much 
intrumentally  oriented.  In  fact,  absolute  or  pure  rationality  is  impossible  to  enact.  Only 
bounded rationality is available. (Simon, 1945).  
 Public administrators such as city park managers make investment decisions according to 
some criterion of satisficing that expresses a compromise they make between the content of 
the problem they address and the local context of uncertainty they face. Behavioral theories 
supply  the  best  vehicle  in  order  to  understand  policy  making  processes  and  functioning 
mechanisms  inside  economic  organizations  (Cyert  and  March,  1963).  Three  concepts  are 
fundamental:  the  goals  the  various  units  pursue,  the  way  information,  opportunities  and 
support are built and elaborated, the choice or decisions processes. Four main mechanisms are 
identified:  conflict  avoidance,  uncertainty  reduction,  problem  solving  as  solution  seeking 
initiator, organizational learning through former experience and rules of attention allocation.   
Organizations such as firms are political coalition or arenas, meaning that power as an issue 
and  as  a  dynamics  plays  a  major  role  for  the  administrative  behavior  (March,  1962). 
Collective goals do not exist as far as they provide common references subsuming individual 
goals or particularistic preferences.  Therefore institutional devices are needed in firms in 
order to channel opportunistic behaviors and ensure some collective stability. 
 Another contribution questions how organizations as such produce decisions (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972). The garbage can model of choice that is presented as a relevant explanation 
of what happens in real life is inspired by observations made on universities. These latter 
institutions look like organized anarchies. Their goals are loosely defined, their technologies 
such  as  education  are  ambiguous  (ambiguity  meaning  that  it  is  not  easy  to  explain  why 
student succeed or not), and the participation of their members to administration and decision 
processes  is  fluid.  Therefore  choices  are  made  in  a  quasi-random  way,  resulting  from 
interactions between fluxes of problems, solutions, choice opportunities and participants. In 
other terms, as it is the case with garbage cans, the piling up of elements is a juxtaposition 
which sequence or order depends from outside events. Based upon electronic simulations, 
such a model does not explain universities as specific organizations, it simply underlines two  
properties of organizations which are organized anarchies. No consensus exists about what a 
decision is, about its basic ingredients (content, time, arena, etc.). And decisions are seldom 
purposive or consequence driven. Only a minority of decisions are problem solving directed. 
Many are not because the choice happens at a time when the problem is already linked to 
other choices. In a high proportion of cases, a third situation is visible: no decision is made 
until the problem has migrated toward other more attractive choices.   
Such  a  perspective  could  generate  a  paradox  for  public  administration.  The  garbage  can 
model brings the deconstruction of the notion of preference to an extreme limit.  If ambiguity 







































7organizational order  and  cause-consequence relationships are difficult to establish, how is it 
possible to manage collective action? Are organizations still a relevant and thick level of 
reality and coordination? Two basic socialization mechanisms make behaviors predictable 
and channel the potential risk factor they represent: organizational routines and institutions. 
Actors select their conducts according to a logic of appropriateness or conformism (March 
and  Olsen,  1989).  Routines  or  legacies  from  the  past  are  powerful  sources.  So  are  also 
cognitive  patterns  and  values  that  are  diffused  by  institutionalization  processes.  Action 
mobilizes cultural elements. Actors fulfill identities by following rules that they imagine as 
being appropriate to the situations.  A theory of learning in ambiguous environments provides 
a framework which explains how individuals and organizations try to reach some degree of 
understanding and intelligence of the contexts which they face  (March and Olsen, 1975), how 
they  allocate  their  attention  to  a  particular  subject  at  a  given  time,  how  information  is 
collected and exploited, etc. (March and Olsen, 1976).  
New institutionalism questions how organized action can be managed and how some public 
order can be governed in pluralistic societies. It offers simultaneously a descriptive and a 
prescriptive perspective to public administration. The platform designed by James March and 
Johan  Olsen  gave  birth  in  1988  to  a  research  consortium  involving  around  the  Stanford 
University campus American and Scandinavian scholars (SCANCOR, Scandinavian Center of 
Organizational  Research).  More  than  thirty field  studies  were  conducted  on  public  sector 
organizations,  specially  in  Sweden  and  Norway  (for  the  latter  country,  see  a  review  by 
Christensen a  nd  Laegreid,  1998b).  They  observed  reforms  of  various  kinds:  introducing 
corporate strategic planning in the relationships between the national government and state 
agencies,  running a public rail company in a decentralized way and with a strong market 
orientation,  introducing  a    three-year  budgeting  methodology  into  national  government 
administration,  setting  up  active  and  participative  county  councils  (Brunsson  and  Olsen, 
1997). They also mobilized a new generation of social scientists who kept an interest in public 
administration  phenomena  such  as  national  administrative  reform  policy  (Christensen  and 
Laegreid,  1998a),  complex  public  building  projects  (Sahlin-Andersson,  1998), 
decentralization  policies  in  municipalities  (Czarniawska  and  Joerges,  1998),  constitutive 
reforms of the European Union (Blichner and Sangold, 1998), municipal accounting reforms  
(Bergevaern,  Mellenvik  and  Olson,  1998)  or  central  government  officials  (Egeberg  and 
Soetren, 1999). 
Such a stream provides ample empirical material and alternative ways of reasoning about the 
adoption of new formal structures and processes by the public sector at a time when in most 
OECD  countries  many  governments  assumed  that  major  surgery  was  needed  in  order  to 
modernize  governance.  They  put  on  comprehensive  administrative  reform  on  the  agenda. 
Policies were formulated to reshape the public sector and to redraw the boundary between the 
state and the market  
Actual administrative reform looks more like a process of organized attention (Laegreid and 
Roness, 1999). Time, energy and attention are scarce resources for political leaders. They 
influence reform policies in an indirect way, maneuvering the scene by steering the actors' 
role  through  procedure  more  than  substance,  using  various  degrees  of  hierarchy, 
specialization and random control. 
Public  management  is  in  fact  the  consequence  of  human  activities,  and  not  the  result  of 
applied  techniques.  Administrative  reforms  inspired  by  New  Public  Management  are 
determined to a large extent by cultural rules and institutional values. . Voluntary reformism 
based upon free rational calculation postulates that leaders are in control and organizations act 







































7reforms  :  simplicity  and  clarity  (principles  and  theories  rather  than  descriptions  and 
perceptions), normativity (bringing order into chaotic reality), one-sidedness (a single set of 
values is legitimate), promises about the future (no instant result production).   The most 
important illusions or errors are the belief that intentions are non-ambiguous, and  the very 
idea that public administration organizations may be controlled and reformed from the top 
through pure thought. Reformers are prisoners of walls which are mental. It is easy to initiate 
administrative reforms, but few are completed (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). Reforms generate 
more  reforms  and  less  changes.  Organizational  forgetfulness  is  supplied  which  allows  to 
accelerate  reforms  and  helps  people  accepting  them.  Reforms  have  become  routines. 
Therefore  top-down  reforms  should  be  avoided  because  their  relationship  with  change 
outcomes is problematic. They paradoxically contribute to stability and prevent change from 
occurring.  
 While actual organizational changes are not the result of planned modernization  reforms, 
observation suggests that they are abundant. Public administrations as such are not innovation 
adverse. They may follow a sequence of transformations which reflect outside factors such as 
labor market dynamics or inside initiatives informally taken by low ranking units.  Real big 
changes in public administration when they happen  take place without much prior discussion. 
It is also easier to generate them when reforms are undertaken in non controversial areas. In 
controversial contexts, attempts at reform make for stability. Hotly debated issues are not 
subjected to any great change. 
 Normative institutionalism suggests two main prescriptions for public administration change 
to occur. There should be a match between rules, identity and situations : succesful reforms 
are culturally sensitive. Context matters because contexts vary.   
 
4. Institutions and co-constructed systems of action  . 
 
The new institutional theory as applied to public administration has become a very visible 
school of thought in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In other parts of the world, its influence is 
much  less  important.  In  some  European  countries  such  as  France,  Germany  or  Italy, 
contributions inspired by the new institutional schools are not many (Gherardi and Lippi, 
2000). Several factors may explain such a phenomenon. 
In  continental  Europe,  academic  markets  are  much  less  sensitive  to  high  segmentation-
differentiation processes than in the USA where many specialized schools of thought compete 
and also experience rather short life cycles. This has clearly been the case in the field of 
organizational theory during the 1980s, when the Anglo-Saxon research scene was nurturing   
more than thirty different approaches or  so called paradigms. A high level of  skepticism 
across the ruling public elites about fads and fashions such as the New Public Management 
offers  another  reason.  Administrative  reformers  find  that  the  value  premises  on  which 
supposedly rational public management schemes are based lack credibility and are caricatural. 
A  third  and  decisive  reason  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  in  countries  such  as  France  or 
Germany  a  recognized  tradition  of  research  existed  on  public  organizations  as  such  well 
before the 1980s.  
In fact, public administration approaches were, in Europe, taken over by organization theory 
as a specific  field of inquiry much sooner than in the USA or in the UK, and not by the same 
academic tribes.  When Anglo-Saxon political scientists began challenging the hegemony of 
behavioralism and rational choice, Continental European social scientists, who basically were 







































7sociology  of  the  State,  which  was  mainly  inspired  by  Marxist  perspectives,  public  law 
inspired science administrative. The scientific and ideological controversies that fueled the 
emergence of the new institutional theory in the Anglo-Saxon world were considered as less 
relevant in France or in Germany. To argue that the doctrine of rational choice has to be 
rejected by public administration, to recognize that administrative life in the public sector has 
a thickness of its own and that institutions should be considered as independent variables, was 
not relevant news.  
The French sociologie des organisations considers institutional phenomena from  an agnostic 
angle. Institutions should be treated analytically as both independent and dependent variables.  
Michel  Crozier,  its  founding  father,  made  pioneering  in  depth  studies  of  several  public 
agencies (Crozier, 1963). As causes or determinants of bureaucracy, the national education 
system, the cultural norms assigning how to behave in interpersonal interactions, and social 
stratification within society shape the way a public agency like the postal office or a public 
sector  firm  like  the  tobacco  factory  are  structured  and  managed.  Later  studies  made  on 
administrative elites showed that, as consequences or as outcomes of technocratic practices 
and values, institutional configurations such as criteria of efficiency and effectiveness in the 
sectors of urban development and housing, or such as the cognitive content defining general 
interest, are interpreted as social constructs. Public servants who are members of the famous 
Grands Corps trained in exclusive elitist schools such as ENA and Ecole Polytechnique may 
control the public agenda of a whole country in a specific set of policies for a certain period of 
time (Thoenig, 1987). In other terms, analytical schemes used for research purposes should 
keep  the  theoretical  options  open  about  the  status  allocated  to  institutions  and 
institutionalization processes. 
Such a scientific tradition originated around a specific concern for organizational change. 
While Anglo-Saxon rulers and intellectuals were debating about the marketization and the 
economization of public choices, French social scientists questioned the ambitions expressed 
by  politicians  and  public  servants  who  thought  that,  using  economic  planning,    social 
indicators or PPBS,  the central state could manage the whole polity, integrate society and  
guide the economy. Planned change projects defined from the top and implemented through 
hierarchical designs would make a difference. The argument made by public administration 
scholars was that redesigning formal structures would remain a pure cosmetic game, given the 
vicious  circles  of  bureaucratic  change  within  which  ministries  and  public  agencies  were 
caught. A series of long lasting field research projects was launched in the mid 1960s and 
explored various institutional facets and many ministries. 
Two main contributions deal specifically with institutions and institutionalization inside the 
public sector.  
Cooptation mechanisms are widely diffused across the public sector.   Norms circulate and get 
shared  between  interdependent  partners.  Mutual  socialization  occurs.    It  allows  the  field 
agencies of the national ministries - in France, 95 % of the central State two and a half million 
public servants are located in such field agencies across the country - to be embedded in  
micro-communities, to get legitimacy from their environment (specially from local elected 
politicians), and to acquire quite a large  autonomy in their relationship with their respective 
headquarters located in Paris (Grémion, 1976). 
 A breakthrough provided by the French sociologie des organisations refers to the idea that 
cooptation processes as such structure informal but stable organized systems linking state 
public agencies  to specific local environments (Crozier and Thoenig, 1976). The concept of 
cross-regulation  allows  to  identify  why  and  how  interdependence  relationships  develop 







































7sources that give birth and legitimacy to implicit rules of exchange and stable coalitions. A 
politico-administrative system linking State field agencies and local political and economic 
leaders,  such  as  prefects  and  mayors,  supplies  the  backbone  of  the  French  public  sector. 
Political centralization  as a formal structure as well as a set of values is balanced by  the logic 
of  such  local  arrangements.  The  machinery  of  the  central  State  looks  like  a  piecemeal 
fragmented  organizational  fabric.  Its  various  subparts  cooperate  less  than  each  of  them 
cooperates with its local environment leaders. The unified reference framework headquarters 
in Paris impose to their respective field agencies is in fact appropriated by the local front-line 
units in an active way. Formal rigid rules of behavior decided at the top are substituted by 
informal  and  more  flexible  norms  of  implementation  that  are  induced  by  bargaining  and 
quasi-negotiation  practices  between  partners  within  each  subsystem  (Dupuy  et  Thoenig, 
1985). A social norm of flexibility, which content is different according to time and space, 
and  which  is  perceived  as  legitimate  by  social  groups,  prevails  over  a  rule  of  formal 
conformism and of rigid equality of treatment. Public agencies themselves help generating 
exceptions  that  become  local  norms.  They  also  reinforce  differentiation  of  outcome 
mechanisms  and  externalize  the  costs  of  their  mode  of  functioning.  Free  riders  activists 
benefit  while  third  parties,  unable  to  adopt  voice  strategies,  pay  for  the  errors  or  for  the 
consequences. Local polities and politics are shaped by public administration in two ways. 
Easy access to the public sector allocates advantages to certain social categories. For instance, 
a local politician gets a kind of rent she/he may use to favor her/his constituency interests. 
And bureaucratic ways of doing things influence the cognitions and the expectations of social 
groups.    
Beside considering a public agency as a single organization, the French perspective also treats 
it as one actor among many who intervene in handling public affairs. In such a case, analyses 
take sectorial public policies as units of research. Freight transportation (Dupuy and Thoenig, 
1979) and agricultural affairs (Jobert and Muller, 1988) have offered pioneering examples. 
Studies of how governmental agendas are set up, how political and bureaucratic decisions are 
elaborated, and how they are implemented and evaluated, recurrently suggest that for each 
policy a specific system of organized action, which has a logic of its own, defines the problem 
as public and governs its management.  Even when some state ministry or some regional 
authority may play a hegemonic role, its acts and non acts remain to some extent dependant 
from the presence other public agencies, of firms or of not for profit associations. Public 
affairs are not governed in a hegemonic manner by state public bureaucracies. The latter are 
institutionally and functionally embedded within specific social fabrics. 
 Longitudinal  observation  shows  that  public  administrations    have  undergone  a  dramatic 
change since the end of the 1960s (Duran and Thoenig, 1996). The central state agencies do 
not any longer play a dominant role, governing national as well as local public affairs through 
the allocation of subsidies and the elaboration of detailed technical procedures, and relying 
upon cross regulation mechanisms as a way to build an alliance with local elites around policy 
implementation  issues.  A  new  political  and  administrative  system  has  emerged.  Massive 
decentralization has been allocated to regional and local authorities.  New private, associative 
or public players such as the European Commission get a role in policy making.  Public issues 
as  such  coincide  less  and  less  with  the  way  sub-national  territories  are  subdivided  and 
administrative jurisdictions defined. Collective problems are more and more of a horizontal 
nature and are addressed with uncertain solutions.  
In such a context, the state administrative machinery may become marginalized. Its main tool 
in order to keep a relevant role is to use constitutive policies, to diffuse or help emerging new 
cognitions and new patterns of behavior among the numerous partners involved. In other 







































7allow multiple partners to coordinate their views, to speak a common language and to share a 
common  perception  about  what  to  do  how  when  and  for  whom.  Institutionalization  and 
institutional design become weapons used by a weak public actor who is facing a polity which 
is complex, active and non consensual by nature. 
A rigourous and strong analytical framework characterizes the French academic approach. 
Intensive  field  work  and  in  depth  observation  produce  thick  empirical  evidence. 
Interdependance  phenomena  and  relational  games  are  interpreted  as  results  of  strategic 
behaviors  of  actors  operating  in  power  settings  (Crozier  and  Friedberg,  1980).  Social 
regulation - how pluralist sets of actors may find normative arrangements in order to achieve 
some  degree  of  compatibility  between  their  respective  logics  of  action  -  and    systemic 
implications of such social co-constructions are explored. They help understand inner modes 
of  functioning  public  agencies  conform  to,  their  consequences  in  terms  of  outcome 
production,  and identify actual change coalitions and opportunities when they exist (Thoenig, 
1997). 
 By  comparison,  while  scholars  belonging  to  this  tradition  consider  the  new  institutional 
theory  as  a  source  of  massive  conceptual  inventiveness  and  as  an  ambitious  theoretical 
agenda, they express some doubts about its ability to deliver convincing and strong empirical 
study  demonstrations  (Friedberg,  1998).  For  instance,  the  link  between  discourses  and 
behaviors  is  not  made  in  a  convincing  way.  Public  agents  may  adopt  some  norms  or 
cognitions,  but  not  use  them  in  relational  settings  and  in  decision-making  processes. 
Institutions  may  remain  words  without  consequences  on  acts.  Last  but  not  least,  French 
sociologists adopt a vision of politics which is more cynical or machiavellian than the vision 
of  democratic  order  the  normative  institutional  theory  is  favoring  and  which  considers 
responsibility  as  a  consequence  of  the  institution  of  the  individual  (Brunsson  and  Olsen, 
1997), citizens as free, equal and discipline oriented agents, governance as enlightened and 
rule-constrained (Olsen, 1998). 
Collective public action is a key entry in order to understand and predict how institutions and 
institutionalization processes operate. The other idea is that public organizations and complex 
systems of organized action have to be considered specific local social orders. They are meso 
or  intermediary  social  configurations,  which  are  neither  passive  nor  intentional  but  are 
constantly co-constructed in terms of social regulation norms and of membership. 
 A good illustration is provided by education policies. Anglo-Saxon sociologists (see section 
2.3. above) have emphasized the intrinsic homogeneity of institutional aspects, the fact that, 
either formally or in terms of discourses, schools look alike across the territory within a same 
country, or even across different countries. Observation nevertheless suggests that, below the 
surface, schools may differ quite much in terms of their real daily mode of functioning. This 
raises one question never addressed by the new institutional theory: how is it possible that 
local orders exist which create discontinuities and heterogeneities?  
The irony with this research perspective on institutions is that it shows quite much sensitivity 
to differentiation and local specificities although its members belong to a nation-state, the 
French Republic, which founding values incorporate the ideals of unity and equality, and 
which  enforcement  has  been  handled  in  a  centralized-authoritarian  manner.  The  French 
approach is reluctant to institutional theory as a macro perspective that may discover some 
global logics shaping social regimes. It is also quite skeptical when action contexts such as 
public  administration  are  studied  excluding  actors.  From  this  point  of  view,  while,  U.S. 
sociological  institutional  theory  tends  to  negate  the  importance  of  actors,  historical 
institutional  theory,  with  its  focus  upon  path  dependaencies,  allocates  much  attention  to 







































7fragile  constructs  because  they  are  the  non-intentional  outcomes  of  permanent  collective 
tinkering (or bricolage). Discontinuities characterize the essence of public administration in 
particular and of societal order in general. 
Another  influential  school  has  also  developed  in  Germany  under the  influence  of  Renate 
Mayntz.  
The  similarities  with  the  French  perspective  are  quite  many.  Well  before  the  1980s,  this 
sociologist had written a comprehensive book on public administration which was influenced 
by  theory  of  organizations  (Mayntz,  1978).  After  having  led  a  major  program  of  policy 
implementation studies in her country, and within the framework of the Max-Planck Institute, 
she and Fritz Scharpf have set up a perspective called actor-centered institutionalism (Mayntz 
and Scharpf, 1995), which supplies less a theoretical framework than a heuristic tool bag for 
research on the governement of public affairs. 
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